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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Respondent,

-v-

JACKIE LEE SYDDALL,
Appellant.

~
Case No.
i 10788
)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Jackie Lee Syddall, appeals from
a conviction of the crime of burglary in the second degree on trial by jury in the Third Judicial District
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

DISPOSITION IN THE LO,iVER COURT
The appellant was charged by information with the
crimes of burglary in the second degree and grand lar1

ceny. A jury trial was held October 6, 1966. The jurv
returned a verdict of guilty as charged as to the second
degree burglary and the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow
imposed sentence on the appellant of confinement in
the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term as
provided by law of not less than one nor more than
twenty years.

1

RELIE}" SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the judgment of the
Third District Court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent, State of Utah, submits the following statement of facts as being more in keeping with
the rule that evidence will be reviewed on appeal in a
light most favorable to the jury's verdict.

During the night of August 18-19, 1965, the Glendale Market, Salt Lake City, Utah, was entered and a
safe taken from the building but left outside the rear
service door (T.9). At approximately 10:30 p.m.,
August 18, 1965, appellant visited the home of Tommy
Olsen with the express purpose of borrowing Olsen's
1957 blue and white Ford automobile (T.51, 52).
Appellant took the keys to this vehicle and drove it
away (T.52). At this time, appellant suffered from no i
physical infirmity; he moved easily and freely. The :
next morning, appellant was limping on his left foot
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(T.:280). The car was returned on the morning of
August 19, 1965 ( T.84).
At approximately 2 :30 a.m., August 19, 1965, 1lr.
Earl Dunyon was parked in the parking lot of the
Glendale Market and observed a blue and white 1957
Ford automobile backed up to the rear door of the
market ( T .88) . The vehicle's trunk was open and the
car was bouncing; Dunyon then heard a bang and saw
dust rising from behind the vehicle (T.88). A man was
then seen coming around the car favoring his left foot
(T.89, 183). The vehicle pulled away revealing a safe
lying on the ground ( T .89) .
Dunyon followed the vehicle for some time in the
southwest section of Salt Lake City, but lost it when
the occupants fired three shots at him (T.90).
The license number of the Ford corresponded to
the registration issued for a Pontiac owned by appellant
(T.9-:1!). The Ford was, in fact, owned by Tommy Olsen.
The front license plate of the Pontiac had been placed
on the Ford in June, 1965, when the latter was moved
to Salt Lake City from Richfield, Utah (T.160), and
the improper registration remained on the Ford until
the vehicle was impounded on August 23, 1965 (T.161).
Olsen gave investigating officers full permission to examine the Ford (T.94); it was fully searched and paint
scrapings were taken from the bumper and from inside
the trunk (T.95).
These paint scrapings were later matched with
paint scrapings from the safe taken from the market
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and after thorough analysis at the F. B. I. Laboratory
were found to be identical.
Appellant was arrested on August 23, 1965, by
officers of the Salt Lake City Police Department, who
were acting on a tip that appellant was aiding an es·
capee from the Utah State Prison. At the time of his
arrest and for several days thereafter, appellant's left
foot was badly swollen. Officer Dave Bradford of the
Salt Lake City Police Department testified.
As I stated before it was badly swollen. The
left toe was about three times as big as it ought
to be. Looked like an overripe banana. It was
black and blue and it looked like something had
crushed it. ( T .238)
Additional testimony was adduced that appellant
had been seen with an injured foot "around the nineteenth" [of August, 1965} ( T .245), and that the injured
foot could have been the left one (T.251, 256).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E PROSECUTION SUFFICIENTLY
MET ITS BURDEN OF PROO:F AS TO THE
PRIMA FACIE ELEMENTS OF BURGLARY.
Circumstantial evidence of the guilt of accused is
sufficient to sustain a conviction in the State of Utah.
State v. Garcia, 11 Utah 2d 67, 355 P.2d 57 ( 1960):
State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285 (1941),
4

awl cases cited therein. The elements of the corpus
1lelicti need not be proved by direct, positive evidence,
b11t may be proYed by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. People v.
Tims, 171 Cal.2d 671, 341 P.2d 56 (1959).
Appellant cites the case of State v. Burch, 17 Utah
2d H8, 413 P.2d 805 ( 1966), for the proposition that

this would require "strong circumstantial evidence" for
a conviction. With this, the respondent would not take
issue. Nothing is more dear than the right to be free and
men should not be imprisoned on the "merest" of evidence.
This court has on various occasions set forth the
criteria for determining the sufficiency of the evidence
in a conviction based on circumstantial evidence. As
stated in State v. Erwin, supra, 101 Utah at 400-401:
"In order to sustain a conviction, the evidence * * * must be of such persuasive force that
the mind might be reasonably satisfied of all the
necessary facts constituting the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt; and where the proof
of a necessary fact is dependent solely upon circumstantial evidence, such circumstances must
be such as to reasonably exclude every reasonable
hypothesis other than the existence of such fact
and be consistent with its existence and inconsistent with its non-existence. It is not necessary
that each circumstance in itself establish the guilt
of the defendant, but the whole chain of circumstances, taken toyether, 1n11st produce the required proof." (Emphasis added.)
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The facts of this case show: (I) That appellant
borrowed an automobile in late evening; (2) that appellant was physically well at this time; ( 3) that the automobile was used in a larceny attempt; ( 4) that one of
the burglars dropped the stolen safe on his left foot;
( 5) that appellant was limping on his left foot the next ,
day. The lack of eye-witness identification in a burglary
case is not unusual. These crimes are carried out in !
a manner intended to minimize any observation. The
chain of circumstances in this case was sufficient for
the jury to reasonably find appellant guilty of the
crime charged. State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d no, 307
P.2d 212 (1957).
The rules governing the scope of review on appeal
as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict are well settled; that it is the prerogative of the
jury to judge the credibility of the witnesses and to
determine the facts; that the evidence will be reviewed
in the light most favorable to the verdict; and that if, i
when so viewed, it appears that the jury, acting fairly ,
1
and reasonably, could find the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt, the verdict will not be disturbed.
State v. Ward, IO Utah 2d 34, 357 P.2d 865 (1959).
In a criminal prosecution it is the function of the
jury in the first instance, and of the trial court after
verdict, to determine what facts are established by the
evidence, and before a verdict of a jury which has been
approved by the trial court may be set aside on appeal
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, it must
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dearly be made to appear that upon no hypothesis whatcrer is there sufficient substantial evidence to support
the conclusion reached in the trial court. State v.
Walker, 198 Kan. 14, 422 P.2d 565 (1967).

POINT II
THE PROSECUTION DID NOT EXCEED
THE LIMITS OF PROPER CROSS - EXAMINATION OF APPELLANT IN THIS MATTER.
For his second point appellant attempts to show a
prejudical course of conduct on the part of the prosecution to convict appellant by "silent innuendo." Disregarding the obvious semantic impossibility of such a
term, there is no showing that questions asked of appellant went beyond the recognized limits of cross-examination.
This court has on numerous occasions pointed out
the extent to which examination of witnesses rests in the
sound discretion of the trial court, and unless abuse of
discretion can be shown in either admitting or excluding
testimony, the ruling of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal. State v. Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 201
P.2d 764 ( 1949). See also State v. Baca, 102 Ariz. 83,
425 P.2d 108 (1967).
The respondent submits that in no way do the questions prnpounded to appellant exceed proper crossexamination.
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On direct examination, appellant stated that he
met Carla Klotz in downtown Salt Lake City and she
asked him the whereabouts of her husband ( T.219). On
cross-examination, it was adduced that Ronald Klotz
was a recent escapee from the Utah State Prison. Appellant states he was arrested for violation of parole,
suspicion of burglary, and aiding and abetting a fugitive ( T .223) . Therefore, questions concerning the basis
of arrest would be proper.
These was no objection raised to this line of questioning as appellant would have this court believe. The
record is clear that the cited objection referred to appellant's ability to remember dates only (T.224). Appellant further cites a series of questions concerning ,
appellant's marital situation as ground for reversal.
Counsel for both sides were attempting to clarify appellant's whereabouts during the time surrounding August
19, 1965. A close reading of the record shows that
appellant's girl friend at this time was the girl he later 1
married. The terms "girl friend" and "wife" were used
by counsel and appellant almost interchangeably so
cross-examination was necessary for proper identification for the jury (T.227).
Counsel for appellant was fully aware of the possible confusion in the minds of the jurors as to this point
as is shown later in the proceedings.
Q.

'Vho was with him?

A.

His wife.
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Q.

\Vell, who do you mean by 'his wife'? There
seems to be some confusion as to who Mr.
Syddall's wife was at the time. So, if you'll
name names it will be less confusing, I
believe. (T.253)

POINT III
THERE WAS NO ILLEGAL SEARCH O.F
THE OLSEN AUT01\i10BILE SINCE THE
OWNER VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO
THE SEARCH.
For his final point on appeal, appellant attempts
to raise the hue and cry of an illegal search and seizure
in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Appellant could well be complimented on his ingenuity, but legal reality must be observed. The automobile in question was bearing an admitted falsified registration ( T .207) . The investigating
officers knew the registration was false and would have
been justified in impounding the vehicle on that basis.
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-142 (c) (1960).
State v. Dodge, 12 Utah 2d 293, 365 P.2d 798 (1961).
When the owner of the vehicle was informed that there
was cause to believe this automobile had been involved
in a crime, he voluntarily gave officers permission to
search it ( T .95).
There is no evidence that the owner, Olsen, was
im(ler arrest at this time. Olsen testified several times
i11 the course of these proceedings and at no time was the
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issue of the voluntariness of his consent raised. This j,
so patently an unmeritorious claim that it should be
summarily dismissed. Howeyer, respondent will reply
to it for this court's consideration.
The vehicle in question was registered to .Mr.
Thomas Olsen. He consented to a thorough search of
the vehicle. The investigating officers acting on this
consent took paint samples from the rear bumper and
from inside the trunk. A search and seizure is valid if
consent is given.
There is not one scintilla of evidence of either '
dures_s or coercion directed against Thomas Olsen to
gain his consent for the search.
Appellant cites People v. Shelton, 60 Cal. Reph·.
433, 388 P.2d 665 (1964), for the proposition that the
issue of a free, knowing, and voluntary consent is an
issue of fact to be determined from all the facts and
circumstances.
All the facts and circumstances in the matter poinl
up the voluntariness of the consent. Olsen knew he was
not involved in a criminal activity; therefore, it was in
his best interest to have a search that would result i11
him being cleared of any implication in it. He did and
he was. Appellant has no possession or interest in subject vehicle sufficient to object to the search or admission 1
of items so discovered. State v. Montague, 18 Utah 2d ,
38, 414 P.2d 958 ( 1966). State v. Pinkerton, J.35 P2d
661 (Wash. 1967).
10

The most damaging point to appellant's argument
is the simple fact that at no time during the course of
this trial did defense counsel, a very able and competent
criminal trial advocate, make any objection to the admissibility of the paint samples taken from the subject
rehicle. This lack of objection indicates a waiver on the
part of the appellant and further tends to support the
conclusion that those who saw Olsen and heard him
testify felt that there was no question as to the voluntariness of his consent.

CONCLUSION
The respondent would submit that substantial evidence of the guilt of appellant has been shown. The
legal claims of error on which the appellant relies for
re,·ersal are wholly without merit. This court should
affirm.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
LEROY S. AXLAND
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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